Translation: Qwen3-4B

Marx and Morality

Jan Eufinger - October 17th 2025

Really existing socialisms suggest that Marx’s critique of society requires a moral foundation to prevent brutal dead ends. The revolutionary Aristotelism can provide such a foundation, Jan Eufinger argues. A look at the theory.

Die Linke is gaining momentum in Germany. A key reason appears to be its presentation as a moral counterweight to selfish and “right-wing” ideologies. The long-standing reference to its status as the successor party to the SED and its alleged responsibility for the crimes of East Germany is no longer convincing today. First and foremost, left-wing and Marxist movements generally claim to be improving the world. Yet not only in East Germany, but also in other so-called “reallly existing socialisms,” they ended up with brutal regimes. However, Marx is not thereby refuted by what others have done in his name. Yet, for every leftward movement, there arises the necessity to reflect on how such crimes could have come about and how one’s own movement can avoid similar missteps. This task was undertaken by the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, who died in 2025, and who since the 1950s has questioned the moral foundations of Marxism. For him, the absence of such a moral foundation is responsible for the crimes committed by real socialist regimes: A pure appeal to the interests of the working class (today: the oppressed and disadvantaged) leads to a form of thinking in which the end justifies the means. Particularly problematic is such a view when combined with an avant-garde claim or the historical-philosophical thesis of a necessary progress.

Moral pluralism

Sometimes, this problem is attempted to be solved by combining Marxist critique with one of the established moral philosophies, such as that of Immanuel Kant. Yet for MacIntyre, this is not an option. Thus, he points out that none of the explanatory moral philosophies has succeeded in overcoming the competing approaches. Each has its followers, and their respective arguments are generally insufficient to convince the adherents of the other positions. It is no surprise that we today experience a moral pluralism—mutually incompatible moral views come into conflict within the social sphere. But why is this pluralism a problem? Do proponents of these theories discuss social issues? Is a reasonable solution to the conflict arising from this incompatibility impossible? Moral theories are increasingly being applied contextlessly and arbitrarily to justify interests and to give them a moral appearance. Thus, conflicts between these interests can no longer be resolved by moral principles. Political debate has also lost a generally accepted standard for resolving interest conflicts. To prevent societal collapse, the resolution of social conflicts is increasingly shifting from public debate and the political process into the realm of law. Yet this either leads to a demoralization of democracy or results merely in superficial solutions. For the conflict has now been shifted to questions concerning the design and, particularly, the interpretation of law. In the United States, the selection of the Supreme Court has already become a central arena of political conflict. The Brosius-Gersdorff case shows that the selection of members of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has also become a political matter.

Eudaimonia as an alternative to the dissolution of morality into interests

MacIntyre presents a modernized variant of Aristotle’s ethics. According to Aristotle, all humans strive toward eudaimonia. This is traditionally translated as ‘flourishing,’ with alternative suggestions being ‘prosperity’ or ‘a good life.’ Eudaimonia is not a final state that we need to achieve only once; it is the sum of its components and must be realized anew continually. In our activities, we can pursue two kinds of goods. The first are “inherent goods” or “goods of perfection,” where we engage in an activity for its own sake. The others are “external goods” or “goods of efficiency,” where the activity is merely a means to achieve other ends. An activity that we carry out within a social context for its own sake is called practice. For example, football: Club culture and the quality of play are intrinsic goods, while players’ salaries and the club’s profit are extrinsic goods. This distinction runs through most areas of our society. For instance, in the education system, the intrinsic good of personal development is discussed against the extrinsic good of preparing for the job market. MacIntyre points out that goods of excellence typically compete with and are endangered by goods of efficiency. According to Aristotle, we need a certain amount of external, material goods to lead a good life, but it is exclusively goods of excellence that lead to eudaimonia. Capitalism, with its structurally built-in pursuit of profit—which is enforced by market-driven competition—pursues purely material goods and thus goods of efficiency. Wage work is typically carried out through external goods (wages), leading to a form of alienation of people from their work, since it no longer represents genuine practice. Characteristics that enable us to carry out real practice and engage in activities for their own sake are called arete, which is traditionally translated as ‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’. Virtues, in turn, constitute another central component of eudaimonia. For Aristotle, virtues represent a middle ground between two extremes. Thus, courage is the right measure between cowardice and recklessness. However, where this right measure lies depends on the specific situation and the individual. To determine this right measure, we therefore need phronesis—the practical wisdom. Virtues therefore cannot be taught like knowledge or mathematics, but must be developed through practice. They cannot be acquired solely through books or individually. According to Aristotle, we need role models and teachers who demonstrate in concrete practice what virtuous behavior looks like. By imitating them and practicing virtuous actions, we become virtuous. Moreover, only through social practice can the goods of perfection be acquired. As football illustrates, many of these are directly communal goods that can only be attained through cooperation. The flip side: Whoever behaves immorally in reverse is also practicing that behavior.

Realizing human potential

What then is eudaimonia? Here, a look at Aristotle’s teleological biology is warranted: According to Aristotle, all living beings have an intrinsic purpose or goal that they strive toward. Humans are social beings (zoon politikon) as well as rational beings (zoon logikon). Therefore, we strive to develop our reason within community. This is about realizing human potential. Aristotle therefore rejects hedonistic conceptions of eudaimonia, since, although the satisfaction of physical needs is necessary for him, mere pursuit of physical pleasure amounts to a beastly mode of existence. Eudaimonia, as the sum of its components, requires rather the satisfaction of material needs, well-ordered political arrangements, and the opportunity for theoretical activity—thus enabling one to devote oneself to reason. However, Aristotle’s biology is now considered refuted by modern natural science, which holds that the world is not teleologically designed. We no longer understand the world through an inherent striving of things, but through cause and effect. MacIntyre re-thinks the connection between human nature and reason by comparing humans with other intelligent animals, showing that our reason has evolved and is inherent to our status as natural beings. Nature and reason are thus not two opposing aspects of human beings. He believes there is no fundamental naturalistic fallacy, only certain types of reasoning from nature to ethics that are flawed. To be social and to develop our reason are goals given to us by our nature. However, Kelvin Knight—a representative of revolutionary Aristotelism—argues otherwise. He refers to MacIntyre’s earlier works and grounds teleology entirely in social practice. Since practice is an end in itself, oriented toward its inherent (communal) goods of perfection, it already possesses a teleological form. In our social practice, we therefore set ourselves the goals according to which we orient our lives.

Goods of excellence

Every significant practice, however, requires a certain institutional framework in order to be able to endure. Institutions are, however, bureaucratic structures oriented solely towards external goods. While they are a necessary condition for sustainable practice, they simultaneously carry the risk of displacing the goods of perfection with external goods. The principle of capitalism is profit-making, that is, the acquisition of external goods, and it has a tendency to subject all areas of life to this logic. On the other hand, Aristotelianism emphasizes the primacy of goods of excellence for the sake of eudaimonia. This is its revolutionary character: Institutions that direct practice toward external goods and sideline the goods of perfection must be abolished and replaced by better ones. This applies especially to an economic system that recognizes only external goods. In his last book, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre makes it clear: Capitalism, market economies, and the modern state are based on exploitation and stand in direct opposition to the virtues and goods of excellence. “We therefore must live against the cultural current, just as we must learn to act as economic, political, and moral opponents of the prevailing order.” It is thus about building practices and institutions in conflict with the capitalist social order, ones oriented toward excellence and the achievement of shared goods. Only through such resistive practice can a “revolutionary transformation” even become conceivable. Thus, it provides only the foundation for a liberated society, since MacIntyre’s attempt to derive such a society abstractly from a critique of the existing order either fails fundamentally or leads to Stalinist crimes. Social critique must therefore not rely on interests and merely seek the most effective means to serve them. Institutions like the state are also not neutral tools that can be simply repurposed for different ends. While Marx’s critique of political economy provides an analysis of capitalist structures, MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelianism offers the vision of a better life through a different practice, thereby pointing the way toward a new society. Marx, like MacIntyre, emphasizes that people can freely develop their potential and have the opportunity to live a good life. The world one receives is the world one builds. Anyone who today in political practice relies on the suppression of other viewpoints, on “cancel culture,” or on violence will also build a society that functions according to these principles.